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ABSTRACT The decisive epistemological and methodological moment of feminist
analysis and critique is the moment of intervention. An intervention does not
require a standpoint; instead, it displaces the locus of critique from the standpoint
to the effects or consequences of critique. Intervention requires no new information
or hitherto concealed facts about the object being interfered with. The critical
effects of an intervention are the results of what is called a ‘sexing-up’ strategy.
Different epistemological and methodological aspects of this strategy are
discussed and a connection established between feminist interventions in science
and politics, and the strategy of sexing-up.
KEY WORDS critique ◆ feminism ◆ intervention ◆ phallogocentrism ◆ science ◆
sexing-up ◆ translation
In this article, I approach and elaborate the notion of feminist critique as
intervention. I do this by presenting some epistemological and methodo-
logical considerations revolving around what I would like to call the
‘strategy of sexing-up’. This strategy is far from my invention since it is a
common phenomenon not only in political life, but also in scientific
activity as well as in human and non-human communication. My contri-
bution is to establish a connection between critical interventions in science
and politics and the strategy of sexing-up. Before I probe into the rather
disparaging expression ‘sexing-up’, I give an account of feminist critique
as intervention. I then discuss some epistemological and methodological
challenges and implications of the strategy of sexing-up, as an essential
aspect of feminist intervention by involving some arguments and insights
from the works of Bruno Latour, Michel Foucault and Luce Irigaray.
Finally, I show how a sexing-up strategy might be applied to empirical
research by addressing the question of gender equality in academia.1
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THIS IS NOT AN EXIT
Feminist theory is marked by the challenge that there is no simple or
correct way to situate oneself outside phallogocentrism ‘that would result
from the simple fact of being a woman’ (Irigaray, 1985b: 162). This chal-
lenge has left those feminists working in the fields of epistemology and
methodology in the uneasy, but promising, situation of having to develop
concepts and tools of analysis and critique that do not presuppose a
standpoint of resistance outside phallogocentrism. A standpoint given by
the categories of ‘woman’ or ‘women’, or by the notion of tacit female
knowledge, or by a final moment of truth where feminist politics and
knowledge are somehow fused in a higher unity, and so on. Over the
years, this situation has drawn feminist researchers’ attention to the risk
they themselves run of reproducing hegemonic gender discourses, –
employing concepts and practices recognized as intelligible and legiti-
mate by and within the very same social, cultural and symbolic order that
produces and reproduces invisibility, exclusion and inequality: the objects
of feminist analysis and critique. On the other hand, this situation has also
caused some uneasiness among feminist researchers: How can feminist
analysis and critique unfold as a feminist endeavour without a standpoint
or locus of critique given by the unified or unifying category of ‘woman’,
or a narrative of oppression and emancipation of ‘women’? How is
feminist critique possible if it is impossible to situate the locus of critique
outside phallogocentrism?
One way to approach this problem is to rethink the subject of feminist
critical thinking. In Metamorphoses, Rosi Braidotti (2002) is reclaiming
sexual difference as a decisive part of feminist theory by rethinking
materiality and embodied subjectivity, in terms of transformation and
change. As she puts it in the prologue, we are living in:
Times of fast-moving changes which do not wipe out the brutality of power
relations, but in many ways intensify them and bring them to the point of
implosion. Living in such times of fast change may be exhilarating, yet the
task of representing these changes to ourselves and engaging productively
with the contradictions, paradoxes and injustices they engender is a peren-
nial challenge. (Braidotti, 2002: 1)
Braidotti’s answer to this challenge is to replace the question of being with
the question of becoming; a feminist analysis and critique of ‘our’ times
cannot take the stable categories of ‘woman’ and ‘women’ as a point of
departure. Rather, it must rethink subjectivity, by ‘re-inventing the very
image of the subject as an entity fully immersed in relations of power,
knowledge and desire’ (Braidotti, 2002: 7). This is a logical move to make
in an attempt at deconstructing the essentialist tendencies in feminist
theory; by introducing the question of becoming, as part of a reinvention
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of subjectivity feminist critique without reference to a stable standpoint of
critique.
Another way to make sense of feminist critique without presupposing
a standpoint of critique – given by the unified or unifying category of
‘woman’ – is to situate the decisive moment of feminist critique in the
consequences of the critique; consequences both of 30 years of second-wave
feminism for contemporary feminist thinking, as well as consequences of
contemporary feminist thinking for the assessment of the multiple
histories of feminism and for the future of feminist thinking (Kavka, 2001:
xii). This emphasis on the consequences rather than the standpoint of
feminist critique – given by the category of women – not only seems to be
able to heal the wounds on the feminist body left on the theoretical battle-
fields of the 1990s.2 It also opens up the possibilities of a critical revision
of critique, since feminism understood as critique tends to turn on the
negative relation between the locus – reduced to the foundations – and the
object of critique rather than the consequences of the critical endeavour. I
have elsewhere (Egeland, 2003, 2004) discussed the possibility of under-
standing feminist critique as intervention. Arild Utaker (1984) explains
critique as intervention as a form of critique interfering with the object of
critique. To intervene or interfere is to describe the object of critique
neither from the ‘outside’ of the object, nor from a perspective that is
limited by the criteria defining the object. Critique as intervention can
thus be conceived of as a strategy aimed at describing, redescribing,
combining and recombining elements of knowledge that may have critical
effects. Michel Foucault, for instance, exercises critique as intervention by
linking practices of power with practices of knowledge – instead of separ-
ating them by describing them in opposition to one another (Schaanning,
2000). An intervention does not require a standpoint, instead, it displaces
the locus of critique from the standpoint to the effects or consequences of
critique. Intervention is thus a positive, non-veracious project.
Another important aspect of the notion of intervention is that it does
not require new information or hitherto concealed facts about the object
being interfered with. On the contrary, the critical effects of an interven-
tion are the results of descriptions, redescriptions, combinations and
recombinations of the criteria already defining the object in question.
Understood in this way an intervention involves crucial elements of what
can be called a sexing-up-strategy.
To ‘sex up’ something is to exaggerate, hype up or highlight it. In
Norwegian, the corresponding expression is sprite opp – i.e. to infuse an
object with alcohol or spirits to make it appear more interesting than it
perhaps otherwise would have been. To ‘sex up’ is thus not to lie about an
object or a situation, but to infuse them with elements that make them
noticeable. These elements do not have to originate from another context
than the context of the object of the sexing-up strategy, but they must
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contribute to a process where the object is made more noticeable, attrac-
tive, interesting or worth some exploration. To sex up an object is necess-
arily to intervene in and interfere with the criteria defining the object in
order to attain specific effects. This also means that the criteria defining
the object are exposed. To employ a sexing-up strategy, in an intervention,
is to interfere – not out of innocence or ignorance, but out of result-
oriented considerations. To sex up a subject is to deny claims of truth. The
effect of an intervention involving sexing-up strategies does not refer to a
standpoint of truth guaranteeing the legitimacy of the intervention.
Few, if any would dispute that politics and political arguments rest
heavily on interventions involving sexing-up strategies. Or else nothing
would ‘happen’; no decisions would be made, no action would take place.
A significant – and successful – sexing-up case from the realms of politics
is the British government’s sexing-up of the documents concerning Iraq’s
so-called ‘weapons of mass destruction’ in the autumn of 2002.
SEXING-UP – A CASE STORY
During the build-up to the US-orchestrated invasion of Iraq in March
2003, the British government in September 2002 produced a long-awaited
dossier of evidence about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Among its
claims – as highlighted in Prime Minister Tony Blair’s foreword – was that
‘[Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein’s] military planning allows for some of
the weapons of mass destruction to be ready within 45 minutes of an
order to use them’. In May 2003, an anonymous official said to have been
involved in drawing up the dossier told BBC Radio 4’s Today programme
defence correspondent Andrew Gilligan that the document was ‘sexed
up’ at the behest of Downing Street against the wishes of the intelligence
services.
Since the British government’s justification for joining the invasion of
Iraq was the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruc-
tion, this accusation was a serious and undermining blow to the argu-
ments that had legitimated the UK’s active part in the coalition forces.
The accusation was thus vigorously denied while the anonymous official
was eventually revealed as Dr David Kelly, who later committed suicide.
The British government’s reputation had already worn pretty thin, but
Lord Hutton’s investigation – following in the wake of Dr Kelly’s suicide
– tried to pour calming oil onto troubled water, by concluding that the
dossier could be said to have been ‘sexed up’, if this expression implied
that it was drafted to make the case against Saddam Hussein as strong as
intelligence permitted. In the context of the accusations made against
the government, however, ‘sexed up’ was understood to mean that the
dossier had been embellished with items of intelligence which the
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government itself knew or believed to be unreliable, or even downright
false. And, the Hutton report concluded, this allegation was unfounded.3
The British government was released of the accusations made against it,
and the continual justification of the war against terrorism could go on as
planned.
Now, how is this excerpt from the neo-imperialist discourse of ‘war
against terrorism’ interesting for an elaboration of feminist intervention? It
is interesting because it illustrates how an intervention by means of a
sexing-up strategy interferes with and changes the object in question, thus
clearing the way for a specific conclusion and a specific action to take
place. The sexed-up arguments in the case described were turned into
questions of style; they were only drafted to make the case as strong as the
already approved knowledge permitted. After the British government
was cleared of the accusation of sexing-up information in an illegitimate
way – i.e. having embellished the information with items known or
believed to be unreliable or downright false – the sexed-up arguments
continued to function in the building up of the atmosphere calling for
action against Iraq. All the British government had to do was to dis-
associate itself from a specific illegitimate and invalid means irrespective
of the action in question. Confronted with accusations of ‘sexing-up’ the
dossiers of evidence about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, they only
had to deny that the dossiers rested on an illegitimate, invalid and thus
tottering foundation – i.e. on false information about the military situation
in Iraq. Warfare was never the problem, only the nature of the arguments
that made it necessary. And as long as the British government could argue
that the sexing-up strategy was employed not in order to produce a false
picture of the situation but in order to make the case against the enemy as
strong as possible, everything was in perfect order. The intervention was
successful.
Now, this is politics. But why should it not be part of science and of
analysis and critique? Why should interventions involving sexing-up
arguments be dismissed? Is it because they are sexy or attractive in a
disturbing and unpleasant way? As I have mentioned earlier, sexed-up
arguments are not the result of powerless, innocence or ignorance; they
are the result of result-oriented considerations. Like prostitutes faking it
for a living, sexed-up arguments are being used and abused for different
purposes, but seldom in the broad daylight of science. They are best
avoided. Or perhaps not? In what follows, I try to show that even if
sexing-up might be interpreted as a monstrous and illegal strategy,
leading to a deadly end for some parties – as in the case of the sexed-up
dossier of evidence about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction – sexing-up
might not only be a promising methodological tool in feminist analysis
and critique; interventions involving sexing-up strategies are already part
of science.
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TRANSLATING ‘SEXING-UP’ INTO ‘TRANSLATION’
Post-positivist and feminist theories and studies of science and scientific
activity have brought to light many of the cultural, ideological and discur-
sive struggles that permeate or even precondition science and scientific
activity beneath the surface of the ethos of science – an ethos described by
Robert Merton as the interrelated norms of universalism, ‘communism’,
disinterestedness and organized scepticism (see Merton, 1996). Bruno
Latour’s (1987) Science in Action, for example, describes the way ‘sexing-
up’ subjects – or ‘translation’ as Latour calls it – is a necessary and unavoid-
able strategy in scientific activity. Scientists cannot avoid ‘sexing-up’
subjects because their activity is nothing without the support of an extra-
scientific context; scientists are wilful actors that constantly have to attend
to and unfold an activity in a dependence to their surroundings.
This rather trivial observation represents a severe blow to any confusion
of scientific activity with the ethos of science. Instead of being the results of
universalism, ‘communism’, disinterestedness or organized scepticism,
facts are the results of collective ‘sexing-up’ actions striving towards the
establishment of scientific activities as decisive, economically vital activi-
ties with rewarding extensions into politically and economically sanc-
tioned space and time. If this were not so, scientific activity would crumble
into a pointless gesture ‘limited to a point in time and space, myself, my
dreams, my phantasies’ (Latour, 1987: 108). Research is a strenuous
construction of facts intended to attract, enrol and establish a prolific
alliance between the researcher and the surrounding world – e.g. a presti-
gious international research project, a committee in a national/inter-
national research council and/or private enterprise, trade and industry.
Whether this alliance building succeeds or not, the premises under
which the researcher has to operate are ultimately unpredictable; even if an
economic or political alliance is established, the researcher has no guaran-
tee that the results of the alliance won’t be transformed into something
unintended: ‘The fate of facts and machines is in later users’ hands; their
qualities are thus a consequence, not a cause, of a collective action’
(Latour, 1987: 259). The researcher is, in other words, dependent on the
action of others:
You may have written the definitive paper proving that the earth is hollow
and that the moon is made of green cheese but this paper will not become
definitive if others do not take it up and use it as a matter of fact later on.
You need them to make your paper a decisive one. If they laugh at you, if
they are indifferent, if they shrug it off, that is the end of your paper. (Latour,
1987: 104)
This dependency makes the strategy of translation necessary; alliances
must be involved and controlled at the same time and this is only made
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possible through translation. Latour here understands translation in a
geometrical sense; the facts-through-alliance enterprise of science is a
speech act where interests, resources and persons are moved or reshuffled
from one location to another. ‘Translating interests means at once offering
new interpretations of these interests and channelling people in different
directions’ (Latour, 1987: 117). This reshuffling would be impossible if
sexing-up strategies of exaggeration, hyping up or highlighting were not
constantly involved. In order to translate and channel interests, persons
and resources in required directions, specific aspects of the subject in
question have to be infused with elements that make it noticeable. Sexing-
up strategies are thus core activities in translation processes, and if scien-
tific activity presupposes translation in Latour’s sense of the word,
sexing-up strategies are as unavoidable in science as they are in politics –
whether we like it or not.
THE WORLD IS NOT THE ACCOMPLICE OF OUR
KNOWLEDGE
Epistemologically, we cannot avoid translations or sexing-up interfer-
ences with the world. In his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in
1970, ‘The Order of Discourse’, Michel Foucault presents some epistemo-
logical and methodological premises for what was supposed to be his
future research projects. For an elaboration of critique as intervention
involving strategies of sexing-up I find his outline of the so-called ‘prin-
ciple of specificity’ particularly interesting:
We must not resolve discourse into a play of pre-existing significations; we
must not imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which we
would have only to decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our knowl-
edge; there is no pre-discursive providence which disposes the world in our
favour. We must conceive discourse as a violence which we do to things, or
in any case as a practice which we impose on them; and it is in this practice
that the events of discourse find the principle of their regularity. (Foucault,
1981: 67)
The formulations here are perhaps a bit rough and pompous, and
strictly speaking, the principle of specificity does not imply any ‘new’
philosophical thoughts about the relation between the world and our
knowledge of it. Furthermore, the principle refers to an epistemological
and methodological scheme that implies few indications of how to trans-
late the principle into some kind of ‘directions for use’ in analysis and
critique. Such ‘directions for use’ are not needed for an elaboration of
critique as intervention, though. The important point to realize in relation
to critique as intervention and the strategy of sexing-up is that any
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description of the world implies an interference with the world, since the
world does not turn towards us a ‘legible face’ that we would only have
to decipher. What this means is that ‘translations’ and sexing-up strategies
must be replaced from the illegal and monstrous ‘outside’ and into the
core of analysis as well as critique. This does not imply that analysis and
critique should be turned into a non- or anti-scientific, magic enterprise
devoid of clarity or rationality. On the contrary, critique as intervention
has to employ precisely the criteria defining the object of critique, and the
strategy of sexing-up is an essential part of this; an intervention to sex up
a subject does not only mean to infuse it with elements that make it more
noticeable but also to make the criteria defining it more noticeable.
SEXING-UP A SEXUAL INDIFFERENCE – LUCE IRIGARAY
I referred earlier to Luce Irigaray’s conclusion that there is no ‘simple
manageable way to leap to the outside of phallogocentrism, nor any
possible way to situate oneself there, that would result from the simple fact of
being a woman’ (Irigaray, 1985b: 162; emphasis in original). In Irigaray’s
early readings and rereadings of the western philosophical canon, a
decisive connection is being established between phallogocentrism and
sexual indifference.4 I read Irigaray’s establishment of this connection as
the result of a sexing-up reading strategy. The feminine in the works of
Irigaray is neither positive nor negative because woman as The Other is
not. Not because woman as The Other is not yet, as in not-yet-represented,
but because she is unrepresentable. ‘Woman’ transcends and defies the
possibilities of representation within the frameworks of phallogocen-
trism. Irigaray emphasizes this in her early works by outing phallogocen-
trism in a series of reopenings of the key concepts and myths of the
western philosophical canon. The reopenings not only reveal an omission
of the feminine – as in her reopening in Speculum of ‘The myth of the cave’
in Plato’s Republic; the reopenings also reveal an omission of sexual differ-
ence. The domination of the philosophical logos stems ‘in its greatest
generality perhaps, from its power to eradicate the difference between the
sexes in systems that are self-representative of a “masculine subject”’
(Irigaray, 1985b: 74). With phallogocentrism sexual difference is not only
made possible, it is replaced by a paradoxical and effective sexual indiffer-
ence (Irigaray, 1985b: 72). This sexual indifference cannot be turned into a
genuine sexual difference and the unrepresentability of woman cannot be
abolished by answering questions of what sexual difference and woman
really are. This ‘What is . . .’ question is ‘the metaphysical question – to
which the feminine does not allow itself to submit’ (Irigaray, 1985b: 122),
because the answer to the question ‘What is a woman?’ can only situate
‘woman’ within phallogocentrism.
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Far from arguing in favour of essentialism – a strange allegation that
seems to have been accorded with eternal life within some sections of
feminist theory – Irigaray intervenes in the phallogocentrism of the
western philosophical canon by sexing-up the sexual indifference at stake
in the texts she works through. If ‘woman’ defies the possibilities of repre-
sentation within phallogocentrism and if there is no way to situate
‘woman’ outside phallogocentrism that would result from the simple fact
of being a woman she has to be sexed up as a product of sexual indiffer-
ence, not as the hidden source of sexual indifference. The critical effects of
Irigaray’s interventions are not only that the criteria defining the philo-
sophical subject have been made noticeable, but that they imply a possi-
bility for feminist analysis and critique to move away from questions
about woman as the subject or object within or outside phallogocentrism
towards attempts at clarifications of the criteria defining and reproducing
phallogocentrism. Thus it might become more noticeable that sexual
discrimination not necessarily has anything to do with sexual indiffer-
ence, but perhaps sooner should be understood as a question of phallogo-
centric sexual difference.
Against the power of phallogocentrism to reduce and wipe out the
other in the Same, the strategy of sexing-up lends itself to feminist
analysis and critique. Not just as a reading strategy, to be used in interven-
tions in philosophical texts, but also as a strategy in empirical research. An
important methodological premise for this assertion is that philosophical
texts can be read as empirical data, and that the data of empirical research
can be read as texts. Concerning the benefit of employing a sexing-up
reading strategy in empirical research this is an implication of the produc-
tivity of problem representations.
PRODUCTIVE PROBLEM REPRESENTATIONS
I employ the concept ‘problem representation’ following Carol Bacchi
(1999), who argues that political and social problems do not exist in them-
selves, but are established through interpretations, descriptions and nego-
tiations of meaning. Bacchi bases her argument on efforts to integrate
discourse analytic perspectives into policy studies, and she calls her
approach ‘What’s the problem represented to be?’ – formulated as a
question replacing the perhaps more obvious one: ‘What’s the problem?’
According to Bacchi:
. . . it makes no sense to consider the ‘objects’ or targets of policy as existing
independently of the way they are spoken about or represented, either in
political debate or in policy proposals. Any description of an issue or a
‘problem’ is an interpretation, and interpretations involve judgement
and choices. Crucially, we also need to realize that interpretations are
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interventions since they have programmatic outcomes; that is, the interpret-
ation offered will line up with particular policy recommendations. . . . More
directly, policy proposals of necessity contain interpretations and hence
representations of ‘problems’. Therefore, we need to shift our analysis from
policies as attempted ‘solutions’ to ‘problems’, to policies as constituting
competing interpretations or representations of political issues. (Bacchi,
1999: 1–2)
I think that a significant implication of Bacchi’s approach concerns the
emphasis on the productivity of problem representations; ‘policy propos-
als have inbuilt problem representations. That is, whatever is proposed
creates in its formulation the shape of the problem addressed’ (Bacchi,
1999: 66). Taking Bacchi a bit further, what this means is not only that
different ideology-conditioned problem representations result in differ-
ent solutions – that would be a rather trivializing merge of Marxist with
Foucauldian epistemology; it also means that specific solutions actually
presuppose specific problem representations. In order to attain specific
critical effects or non-equal positionings in attempts at building accounts
of the world that can be ‘partially shared and friendly to earth-wide
projects of finite freedom, adequate material abundance, modest
meaning in suffering, and limited happiness’ (Haraway, 1997: 187),
special awareness has to be paid to the productivity of problem represen-
tations. The positive challenge for feminist critical intervention in science
and politics following this argument is that it opens up possibilities of
negotiations and renegotiations of problem representations, with a view
to the effects, and not the standpoint or point of departure for the inter-
vention. If specific solutions presuppose specific problem representations
it is actually possible to obtain specific critical effects of an intervention.
This is crucial for feminist analysis and critique. Furthermore, an aware-
ness of and an ability to take into account the productivity of problem
representations imply a recognition of translations or sexing-up strate-
gies as part of the negotiations and renegotiations of the problem repre-
sentations in question. If problems do not exist in themselves – i.e. are not
recognized as problems – they have to be made so to speak, and they
have to be made through reinterpretations, descriptions and renegotia-
tions of meaning. This problem-making process involves translations
and sexing-up strategies insofar as to sex up a subject is not only to infuse
it with elements that make it more noticeable, but also to make the criteria
defining it more noticeable and open to negotiations and renegotiations of
meaning. As a conclusion to this article, I argue that an awareness of the
productivity of problem representations can lead to an effective sexing-
up of a subject, that would otherwise find itself devoid of any problem
status. The subject I have in mind is the question of gender equality in
academia.
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SEXING-UP A PROBLEM
I think that the question of gender equality in academia is a good illus-
tration of how important it is to reflect upon ‘the representations offered
by those who describe something as a problem and by those who deny an
issue problem status’ (Bacchi, 1999: 4), because it shows how different
productive problem representations limit the range of possible solutions.
According to the Norwegian Council for Higher Education’s committee
Women in Science5 only 13 percent of the full-time professors in Norway
are women. In the Nordic countries, Finland has the highest number of
female professors, with approximately 18 percent, and Denmark the
lowest number, with approximately 10 percent. Does this mean that we
are talking about a problem of gender barriers in academia? I would say
no. Gender barriers in academia are not a problem, or at least not a valid
problem. This may sound a bit strange: am I suggesting that a discrimi-
nating mechanism making women’s scientific contribution invisible in
academia and unattractive as a labour force, favouring men and projects
affirming masculine representations of our world, does not exist or is an
acceptable element of academia? No.
What I have found by analysing discourses of gender and science in
academia, based on interviews with employees and students at a Danish
university, is that gender barriers simply do not make sense as a problem
within the frameworks of academia. Solutions to this (meaningless)
problem correspondingly do not make any sense as long as these solutions
are based on discriminating tools as for instance quotas and earmarking.
Discrimination based on ‘blind’ scientific judgements concerning quality,
and the guarantee of basic equal opportunities, are the indisputable ideals
of academia, not discrimination based on gender and an unequal distri-
bution of opportunities. I am not basing this argument on what my
informants ‘told me’. I am basing my argument on an analysis of the
problem representations that were negotiated, renegotiated and estab-
lished in the interview texts.
What this analysis has led me to conclude is that gender barriers are not
a valid problem in academia: gender barriers do not in themselves make
sense as a problem – they have to be made a problem. This can be done in
many ways. What these different ways have in common is that trans-
lations and sexing-up strategies must be involved. To make gender
barriers into a problem could mean sexing-up the problem by ‘revealing’
different dubious and hidden agendas, secret networks and unfair mech-
anisms, or pointing to the fact that highly educated women have the most
children, and that many women simply have priorities in life beyond
scientific activity. This would make the subject noticeable, but the
question is whether these problem representations imply solutions that
could make sense, in a context where they were supposed to have critical
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effects. If to sex up a subject is not only to infuse it with elements that
make it more noticeable, but also to make the criteria defining it more
noticeable – and thus open to negotiations and renegotiations of meaning
– then it seems insufficient to continue to insist on the existence of gender
barriers. As if the world actually is ‘an accomplice in our knowledge’.
It also seems insufficient to try to track down a secret, misogynist head-
quarters of male academic generals, who constantly attempt to keep
academia a culture of men. If reality is established in processes of power
exercised with points of departure in interplays between various non-
innocent positions, no headquarters can be found. This does not imply that
more or less hidden agendas do not exist or that gender barriers are the
sad results of speculations of paranoid feminists unable to establish
successful careers for themselves. The point I am trying to make is rather
that the ways academia and the problems of gender barriers and inequal-
ity in academia are presented may be part of the problem of gender barriers
and inequality, because we are dealing with problems that do not necess-
arily make sense as problems. If the sexing-up of gender barriers as a
problem is also an intervention with critical effects, I think that what is
needed are problem representations that construct, describe, combine and
deconstruct intersections of categories that normally would resist inter-
section with a view to the effect of the intervention.
One way to make gender barriers in academia a problem, is to sex up
the academic subject through a deneutralization of academia, where the
academic subject becomes situated in intersections that make him or her
noticeable as a non-neutral agent (Søndergaard, 2003). Another way is to
sex up science itself, as a sexing-up enterprise, involving what Latour
refers to as translations: where interests, resources and persons are moved
or reshuffled from one location to another. In such a context, the construc-
tion and dismantling of barriers – also gender barriers – would be signs of
normality; they would be considered parts of an enterprise where gender
equality is never a matter of course, but a subject that has to be the critical
effect of constant interventions.
Since the world does not show us a ‘legible face which we would have
only to decipher’ no solutions to problems can be said to be reasonable
because they rely on more or less correct descriptions of the real world.
Solutions to specific problems are reasonable because they rely on
problem representations that put specific limits on our knowledge of a
specifically ‘sexed-up’ world.
NOTES
1. The question of gender equality in academia was the subject of my PhD
dissertation, ‘“But it hasn’t got anything to do with gender”: Gender, Gender
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Barriers and Academia – Constructions of an Invalid Problem’ (Egeland,
2000). The notion of feminist critique as intervention is a subject of my
present postdoctoral project ‘What Is Feminism?’ (Egeland, 2003, 2004).
2. The climax of the battle of feminism in the 1990s was reached in the collec-
tion Feminist Contentions (Benhabib et al., 1995).
3. Source: BBC News Online.
4. I am here in particular referring to her works Speculum (Irigaray, 1985a) and
This Sex Which Is Not One (Irigaray, 1985b).
5. See: www.uhr.no
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